Really? FF's APF is rudimentary, at best. IE 7's is by far, more comprehensive and is measured to be more effective.
While of concern, it is not surprising that IE 7's APF is not well represented, or accurately described here, or elsewhere on the web.
First, IE 7's APF features much more than just a lookup of sites [as FF's does]. IE 7, or the APF tool-bar for IE 6 uses its own scanning engine in addition to a repository of on-line sites; however, unlike FF, IE doesn't have to do a lookup and the database feeds the localized scanning engine, which makes for a faster and more accurate browsing experience in the context of AP.
Further, the APF<Filtration> is extended to Windows Mail, Outlook and Exchange, where a large number of industry partners participate in a comprehensive effort to significantly reduce the impact of Phish sites and mal-ware in general [for example, the message screener, baked client and server side, works to reduce the impact of Phish against those applications facing potential threats]. Consider reading more here, http://download.microsoft.com/download/8/9/5/89538E7A-A094-41A6-921A-4D79E9B41A76/CorporatePhishingPolicy.doc
Finally, APF is but one layer in MS's protection strategy. Mal-ware encountered at the APF would have had to defeat or pass other layers [in the browser, AV and Defender], and it would have to pass, or defeat several additional layers as it moved closer to restricted user space <the default in all versions of Vista, and recommended space in XP> BEFORE it encountered yet more layers beyond the browser <UIPI Brokering, Secure/Protected Desktop and UAC> BEFORE it reached a user's conscience and sound judgment.
FF, regretfully, does not benefit from this layered approach. Worse, where FF/Moz could use MS technologies available to all third parties, it has chosen not to - apparently relying upon the web's ubiquitous army of FUD slingers, bad press and inaccurate reporting [and a ton of money from Google] instead.
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